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The	 ability	 of	 markets	 to	 aggregate	 diverse	 information	 is	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 economics	 and	
finance,	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 such	 aggregation	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	 previous	
laboratory	 experiments.	 	 Most	 notably	 Plott	 and	 Sunder	 (1988)	 find	 clear	 support	 for	 the	
rational	expectations	hypothesis	in	their	Series	B	and	C	markets.		However,	recent	studies	have	
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Hayekian	argument,	 the	ongoing	debate	between	classical	 and	behavioral	 finance	 testifies	 to	
the	 existence	 of	 open	 disagreements	 regarding	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 efficient	 markets	
hypothesis	holds	 in	practice,	 i.e.,	 the	extent	 to	which	market	prices	 tend	to	accurately	 reflect	
available	 information	 (Fama,	 1970;	 Fama,	 2008;	 Shleifer,	 2000;	 Thaler,	 2005,	 2015;	 Shiller,	










could	 thus	 allow	 researchers	 to	 study	 the	 aggregation	 of	 private	 information,	 rendering	 the	
efficient	markets	hypothesis	falsifiable.	This	methodological	breakthrough	was	initiated	by	Plott	
and	Sunder	(1988),	hereafter	P&S,	who	designed	experimental	markets	to	gauge	the	extent	to	
which	 dispersed	 private	 information	 was	 incorporated	 into	 prices.	 In	 their	 design,	 subjects	
traded	assets	that	delivered	one	of	three	possible	dividends	at	the	end	of	each	market	period	




market	 participants	was	 complete	 (e.g.	 the	 state	must	 be	 Z).	 They	 reported	 strong	 evidence	
that,	in	line	with	the	efficient	markets	hypothesis,	market	prices	can	reflect	the	true	asset	value	
if	there	are	contingent	markets	for	each	possible	state	(referred	to	in	P&S	as	Series	B)	or	if	there	
is	a	single	asset	yielding	common	state-specific	dividends	to	all	 traders	 (referred	to	 in	P&S	as	
Series	 C).	 	 An	 equally	 important,	 but	 oft-ignored	 finding	 of	 P&S,	 is	 the	 fragility	 of	 successful	
information	aggregation.	 	P&S	(p.	1117)	highlight	this	 in	their	conclusion	when	they	point	out	
that	“not	all	markets	can	be	depended	upon	to	behave	in	accord	with	the	rational	expectations	





dividends	 (referred	 to	 in	 P&S	 as	 Series	 A)	 do	 not	 yield	 prices	 consistent	 with	 the	 rational	
expectations	model.1				
The	positive	results	of	P&S	have	been	highly	influential,	serving	as	the	basis	for	a	wide	variety	of	
extensions	 and	 applications,	 which	 were	 followed	 by	 a	 wave	 of	 field	 studies	 discussing	 the	







even	 in	 the	 cases	where	P&S	 found	 success.	 	 Several	works	using	 variants	of	 the	P&S	design	
with	a	 single	asset	 (Series	C)	have	 reported	substantial	mispricing	 (see	Biais,	Hilton,	Mazurier	
and	Pouget,	2005;	Hanson,	Oprea	and	Porter	2006;	Veiga	and	Vorsatz	2010;	Corgnet,	DeSantis	
and	 Porter,	 2015;	 2019).	 Similarly,	 Page	 and	 Siemroth	 (2018)	 report	 a	 failure	 to	 aggregate	
private	information	in	contingent	claims	markets,	though	their	setup	differed	from	P&S	(Series	












a	 call	 auction.	 In	 addition,	 no	 work	 in	 this	 literature	 has	 used	 the	markets	 reported	 in	 P&S	
(Series	B)	in	which	the	value	of	dividends	is	heterogenous	across	traders.		
Given	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 literature	 and	 practice,	 we	 believe	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 revisit	 the	
question	of	 information	aggregation.	To	 that	end,	we	conducted	a	 replication	of	 the	work	of	
																																								 																				
1	A	follow-up	study	by	Forsythe	and	Lundholm	(1990)	showed	that	full	information	aggregation	could	be	achieved	










In	P&S	 traders	are	endowed	with	an	amount	of	money,	denoted	 in	 Francs,	 and	assets	 called	
certificates	that	can	be	bought	and	sold	by	the	traders	using	a	continuous	double	auction.		At	
the	 end	 of	 each	 trading	 period,	 certificates	 pay	 their	 owner	 a	 dividend	 that	 depends	 on	 the	
state	of	nature,	which	can	be	X,	Y,	or	Z.		The	state	of	nature	is	not	known	by	any	trader,	but	the	
probability	 distribution	 over	 states	 is	 common	 information.	 Further,	 half	 the	 traders	 are	
informed	of	 one	unrealized	 state;	while,	 the	other	 half	 are	 informed	of	 the	other	 unrealized	
state.	So	for	example,	if	the	state	is	X,	then	half	the	traders	are	informed	the	state	is	not	Y	and	
half	are	informed	it	is	not	Z.		In	aggregate	the	traders	have	sufficient	information	to	determine	











Series	 C	 introduce	 simplifications.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 one	 can	 view	 Series	 A	 as	 the	 experimental	
baseline	and	Series	B	and	Series	C	as	treatments.			
In	 P&S,	 the	 information	 aggregation	 hypothesis	 was	 rejected	 whenever	 the	 data	 on	 prices,	
allocation	 and	 profits	 were	 not	 better	 explained	 by	 the	 Rational	 Expectations	 model	 (RE,	
hereafter)	 model	 compared	 to	 two	 alternative	 models:	 Prior	 Information	 and	 Maximin.	 We	
describe	these	models	below.		
Rational	expectations	(RE)	
If	 the	 pooled	 information	 of	 all	 traders	 identifies	 the	 asset	 value	 with	 certainty,	 the	 fully-



















the	 public	 information	 on	 the	 prior	 probability	 that	 a	 state	 is	 realized	 and	 their	 own	 private	
information	 (Lintner,	 1969).	 	 Each	 individual	 trader	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	willing	 to	 spend	 all	 her	
cash	to	buy	assets	at	a	price	below	her	prior	belief	of	its	value	and	would	sell	all	her	certificates	
















In	 Series	 A,	 P&S	 rejected	 the	 hypothesis	 that	market	 prices	 aggregated	 private	 information.	
However,	P&S	report	successful	information	aggregation	in	Series	B	and	C	which	is	when	the	RE	
model	outperforms	the	PI	and	MM	models	 in	predicting	prices	(see	Table	III	 in	P&S,	p.	1105),	



















finding	 is	 that	 information	aggregation	 successfully	occurs	 in	Series	B	and	C	markets.	P&S	 (p.	
1116)	state	“On	the	positive	side,	experiments	in	the	contingent	claims	markets	(Series	B)	and	




that	 of	 PI	 and	MM.	 	 Our	 replication	 attempt	 was	 preregistered	 in	 the	 AEA	 RCT	 Registry	 as	
AEARCTR-0003660.		
Market	Environment		
The	 parameters	 for	 the	markets	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 1,	which	 is	 a	 subset	 of	 Table	 I	 (P&S,	 p.	
1088).	We	replicated	Markets	4,	5,	7,	8,	and	9	which	correspond	to	Series	B	and	C.	 	The	only	
change	 from	 P&S	 is	 the	 exchange	 rate	 for	 converting	 lab	 earnings	 into	 cash	 payments.	 	 To	
account	for	the	cost	of	living	difference	in	the	approximately	thirty	years	that	have	transpired	
since	the	original	data	were	collected,	the	dollar	per	franc	exchange	rates	have	been	doubled.4	
Within	 each	 series,	 all	 traders	 in	 a	 session	 started	 with	 the	 same	 endowment	 of	 cash	 and	
certificates	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 market	 period.	 As	 the	 initial	 endowment	 of	 Francs	






















































































7	(C)	 I	 12	 4	 25,000	 25,000	 0.003	 50	 240	 490	 1/3	 1/3	 1/3	
8	(C)	 I	 12	 2	 25,000	 25,000	 0.003	 125	 375	 525	 1/3	 1/3	 1/3	





Following	Camerer	et	al.	 (2016),	our	aim	was	 to	ensure	a	statistical	power	of	at	 least	90%	to	
detect	 the	P&S	findings	at	a	5%	significance	 level;	 thus,	we	adopt	 their	method	and	estimate	
the	multiple	of	the	original	sample	size	that	would	be	needed	to	achieve	90%	power	by	using	
the	 standard	 z-test	 power	 formula	 !.!"!! !where	 z	 is	 the	 standard	 normal	 test	 statistic	
associated	with	the	p-value	of	the	original	study.		The	main	statistically	significant	results	of	P&S	
correspond	 to	 the	 comparison	 between	 the	 RE	 model	 and	 the	 other	 two	 models	 regarding	
prices	(P&S,	Table	III)	allocations	(P&S,	Table	IV)	and	profits	(P&S,	Table	V).	Regarding	the	result	
on	prices	and	profits,	the	required	sample	size	is	3.019	times	as	large	as	the	original	sample,	as	





















the	 subjects	 were	 experienced	 in	 Market	 7.	 In	 P&S	 this	 means	 that	 the	 subjects	 were	
participating	with	 the	 exact	 same	 group	 of	 people	 in	 the	 two	markets,	 since	 there	were	 12	
people	in	each	market,	and	there	was	only	one	replicate	of	each	market.		However,	in	P&S	the	
subjects	 in	Market	5	were	experienced	either	 in	Market	3	or	4.	 	Thus,	our	Market	5	 sessions	
were	formed	by	combining	half	the	subjects	 in	one	Market	4	session	with	half	the	subjects	 in	












4	B	 None	 12	 13	 4	 $7	 210	min	 27.19	
5	B	 Market	4	 12	 9	 4	 $30	 150	min	 33.89	
7	C	 None	 12	 14	 4	 $7	 180	min	 39.78	
8	C	 Market	7	 12	 7	 4	 $27	 120	min	 15.64	
9	C	 None	 12	 17	 4	 $15	 210	min	 53.68	
A	 In	 periods	 10-13	of	Market	 4	 and	 10-16	of	Market	 5,	 traders	 also	 completed	 Series	A	markets	 in	 P&S.	We	 followed	 this	
procedure	 for	 Market	 4,	 although	 we	 are	 not	 interested	 in	 analyzing	 Series	 A	 for	 which	 P&S	 did	 not	 report	 successful	
information	aggregation.	Throughout	the	remainder	of	this	paper,	when	we	refer	to	Market	4	we	mean	the	Series	B	portion	
of	the	market	in	periods	1-9.		We	did	not	complete	periods	10-16	(Series	A	markets)	in	Market	5	as,	unlike	Market	4	traders	



















Conduct	of	each	session	closely	 followed	the	procedures	 laid	out	 in	P&S.	 	P&S	(p.	1118)	note	
that	 steps	 “were	 essentially	 similar	 to	 those	 described	 …	 in	 Plott	 and	 Sunder	 (1982)	 with	
appropriate	 modifications	 to	 the	 instructions…”	 Thus,	 all	 handouts	 and	 instructions	 for	 this	




Stage	1.	 	 Subjects	were	 trained	with	 the	mechanism	 (a	bingo	 cage)	used	 to	draw	 the	
state	of	nature.	 In	Plott	 and	Sunder	 (1982,	p.	693),	 it	 is	noted	 that	10-20	draws	were	
completed	 until	most	 subjects	 predicted	 the	most	 likely	 outcome.	 	 In	 our	 replication,	
there	were	always	exactly	10	draws	for	this	training.			
Stage	 2.	 Subjects	were	 trained	with	 the	mechanism	 to	 provide	 signals	 (referred	 to	 as	
clues)	about	the	state	of	nature.	P&S	note	(p.	1118)	that	this	training	lasted	between	8	
and	 10	 trials.	 In	 our	 replication,	 there	were	 always	 exactly	 10	 draws	 for	 this	 training.		
Subjects	were	given	a	Clue	Sheet	with	30	rows.	The	first	10	rows	were	used	for	training,	
and	 then	 their	 clue	 for	 the	 first	market	 period	was	 on	 row	11.	 This	 ensured	 that	 the	








before	 the	 session.	 We	 also	 went	 through	 an	 example	 sequence	 of	 bids,	 asks,	 and	
acceptances.	 The	 example	 varied	 based	 on	 whether	 one	 or	 multiple	 assets	 were	
available	 for	 trade.	 As	 in	 P&S,	 subjects	 could	 hold	 short	 positions	 during	 trading,	 but	
incurred	a	penalty	equal	to	300	francs	plus	the	highest	transaction	price	in	that	period	
per	unit	short	at	the	end	of	a	trading	period.		This	contrasts	with	Plott	and	Sunder	(1982,	
p.	 696)	 where	 short	 positions	 were	 not	 allowed,	 and	 hence	 this	 necessitated	 a	
modification	to	the	instructions	(see	Appendix	B).			







ample	 whiteboard	 space,	 and	 we	 never	 had	 to	 erase	 information	 mid-period.	 The	
Information	 and	 Record	 Sheets	 were	 collected	 at	 the	 end	 of	 each	 period,	 and	 new	
Information	 and	 Record	 Sheets	 were	 handed	 out	 before	 the	 start	 of	 each	 period	 -	
subjects	 kept	 their	Profit	 Sheet	 throughout	 Stage	 4.	 	 In	 our	 replication,	 subjects	were	
allowed	 to	use	basic	 four-function	 calculators	 to	update	 their	 Information	and	Record	





In	Market	 4	where	 the	 series	 type	 changes	mid-session,	 the	 subjects	 repeated	 Stage	 3	 after	
period	9.		In	Markets	5	and	8,	which	involve	only	experienced	subjects	and	were	conducted	as	
brand-new	sessions,	we	repeated	all	five	stages.			
Finally,	 to	 guard	 against	 any	 bias	 from	 the	 auctioneer,	 the	 person	 serving	 in	 that	 role	 was	





show	 the	 graphs	 representing	 all	 asset	 prices	 in	 each	 period	 of	 the	 four	 replications	 of	 each	
market.	Horizontal	lines	indicate	the	predictions	of	the	three	competing	models.		The	width	of	
each	figure	 is	standardized	to	facilitate	period-by-period	comparisons	across	markets	because	
despite	 the	 common	 duration	 of	 each	 period,	 the	 number	 of	 periods	 varies	 substantially	 by	
market.7		A	first	visual	inspection,	as	done	in	P&S,	suggests	that	prices	differ	from	the	RE	model	





allocations	 (Table	 4)	 and	 profits	 (Table	 5).	We	did	 not	 replicate	 these	 conclusions,	 as	 the	 RE	















Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 Z	 Z	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Y	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 97	 10	 20	 170	 215	 80	 215	 -	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 Z	 Z	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Y	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 58	 57	 -	 2	 -	 154	 1	 158	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	








Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 Z	 Z	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Y	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 181	 223	 268	 -	 -	 -	 -	 175	 286	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 181	 100	 46	 4	 250	 385	 -	 414	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	








Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 156	 109	 299	 296	 1	 31	 306	 -	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 193	 315	 1	 67	 1	 32	 -	 1	 449	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	







Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 X	 X	 X	 X	 Y	 Y	 X	 Z	 Y	 Z	 Z	 Y	 X	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	
P&S	 291	 222	 197	 228	 170	 235	 241	 148	 256	 246	 348	 449	 240	 84	 	 	 	




Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 Y	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 512	 140	 517	 376	 366	 369	 126	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





























































































absolute	 price	 deviation	 (MAD)	 ,	 we	 calculate	 the	 average	 across	 sessions	 of	 the	 absolute	
difference	 between	 the	 price	 and	 the	 value	 predicted	 by	 each	model	 (PI,	 RE	 and	MM)	 (see	
Appendix	A	or	P&S).		For	each	session,	this	value	is	calculated	as:		!"# ∶=  average!,! !!,! −!!  
where !	represents	a	transaction,	t	denotes	a	period	in	which	a	state	was	realized	for	the	last	
time,	 !!,!	 corresponds	 to	 the	 transaction	 price,	 and	 !!	 is	 the	 predicted	 price	 under	 the	
appropriate	model.	Thus,	the	mean	absolute	price	deviation	is	computed	as	the	average	over	all	
transactions	 in	 the	 last	 occurrence	 of	 each	 state	 of	 nature	 for	 each	 session.	 The	 second	
measure	 used	 in	 P&S	 is	 log	 odds,	 which	 we	 calculated	 by	 regressing,	 for	 each	 model,	 the	
observed	prices	in	given	session	on	the	predicted	price	under	that	model	(using	price	data	from	
the	periods	corresponding	to	the	last	occurrence	of	each	state	of	nature).	We	then	recovered	
the	 log	 likelihood	 value	 under	 the	 normality	 assumption.	 A	 third	 measure	 of	 information	
aggregation	 developed	 in	 P&S	 is	 the	 percentage	 of	 convergent	 price	 changes.	 The	! + 1!"	
transaction	 is	considered	to	be	convergent	 if	 its	price	 is	no	further	from	the	selected	model’s	
prediction	 than	 the	 price	 of	 the	 previous	 transaction,	!.	 That	 is,	 the	! + 1!"	 transaction	 is	







as	 in	 P&S,	 all	 sessions	 from	 Series	 B	 and	 C.	 But,	 the	 RE	 model	 does	 outperform	 PI	 on	 the	
criterion	 of	 percentage	 of	 convergent	 price	 changes	 even	 though	 RE	 does	 not	 significantly	
outperform	MM	for	this	criterion.	No	model	stands	out	with	regard	to	the	criterion	of	log	odds.	


















allocation	statistic	is	determined	via	the	formula:	! = !!,! −!∈!!!∈! !! !!,!(!) − !!!∈!!!∈! !100	
where	!!,! 	represents	the	number	of	shares	of	certificates	c	held	by	investor	!	at	the	end	of	the	
market,	Ic	denotes	the	set	of	traders	predicted	to	hold	the	asset,	C	denotes	the	set	of	certificates	
in	 the	 market,	 !!,!(!)	 corresponds	 to	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 predicted	 to	 be	 held	 by	 investor	 !	
according	to	model	m,	and	!	is	set	to	the	average	number	of	shares	initially	held	by	all	investors	
in	 Ic.	This	ratio	is	then	averaged	over	the	three	periods	in	which	each	state	was	realized	for	the	




PI	 or	MM.	 These	 findings	 contradict	 Conclusion	 3	 in	 P&S	 (p.	 1106)	 according	 to	 which	 “In	 all	






















































































































































































































































































































































Series	 Market	 Replicate	 PI	 RE	 MM	
B	
4	
1	 4.44	 12.5	 No	Prediction	
2	 3.89	 12.5	 No	Prediction	
3	 3.89	 22.92	 No	Prediction	
4	 9.45	 12.50	 No	Prediction	
5	
1	 14.88	 45.83	 No	Prediction	
2	 16.67	 50.00	 No	Prediction	
3	 20.83	 70.83	 No	Prediction	
4	 14.83	 52.08	 No	Prediction	
C	
7	
1	 31.94	 No	Prediction	 41.67	
2	 27.78	 No	Prediction	 25.00	
3	 9.21	 No	Prediction	 27.08	
4	 38.89	 No	Prediction	 47.92	
8	
1	 5.56	 No	Prediction	 45.84	
2	 38.89	 No	Prediction	 37.50	
3	 52.78	 No	Prediction	 29.17	
4	 30.56	 No	Prediction	 49.99	
9	
1	 40.28	 No	Prediction	 52.09	
2	 26.39	 No	Prediction	 27.09	
3	 23.61	 No	Prediction	 25.00	














Reported	metrics	 for	 each	 session	 are	 based	 on	 the	 last	 period	 in	 which	 the	 state	 was	 X,	 the	 last	
period	 in	which	 the	 state	was	 Y,	 and	 the	 last	 period	 in	which	 the	 state	was	 Z,	 as	 applicable.	 	 Each	
statistical	 test	 compares	 RE	 to	 an	 alternative	 model.	 	 Each	 cell	 in	 the	 lower	 portion	 of	 the	 table	
contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	as	well.		The	model	in	parentheses	is	the	
one	favored	by	the	data	based	on	the	median.		This	table	is	comparable	to	Table	IV	in	Plott	and	Sunder	
(1988).	 	 However,	 P&S	 report	 that	 a	Wilcoxon	 Signed	 Rank	 Sum	 Test	 is	 used,	 but	 that	 test	 is	 not	
defined	 for	any	comparison	between	RE	and	another	model	except	 for	a	 test	between	PI	and	RE	 in	











the	 average	 earnings	 of	 a	 trader	 of	 a	 given	 type	 and	 information	 and	 the	 average	 predicted	
earnings,	 given	 the	 trader’s	 type	 and	 information,	 averaged	 over	 the	 three	 periods	
corresponding	to	the	last	occurrence	of	each	state	of	nature.9	In	line	with	our	previous	findings	
on	 price	 and	 allocation	 predictions,	 we	 do	 not	 find	 that	 the	 RE	 model	 outperforms	 both	
alternatives;	 although,	 it	 significantly	 outperforms	 PI.	 These	 findings	 lead	 us	 to	 reject	
Conclusion	4	 in	P&S	 (p.	1108)	according	 to	which	“In	all	 series	 the	RE	model	 is	a	 significantly	
better	predictor	of	the	distribution	of	profits	than	either	the	PI	model	or	the	MM	model.”	On	a	
positive	 note,	 when	 studied	 separately	 RE	 is	 shown	 to	 outperform	 the	 other	 two	models	 in	
Series	C	markets.	 	However,	 the	profit	prediction	of	 the	RE	model	 for	Series	C	markets	 is	 for	
every	trader	in	the	market	to	receive	the	same	profit.		Hence	the	RE	model	predicts	that	each	







as	 evidence	 for	 information	 aggregation	was	 not	 found	 despite	 using	 for	 each	 session,	 as	 in	
P&S,	only	the	data	for	the	last	occurrence	of	each	possible	state	of	nature.10	Moreover,	we	do	
not	find	support	for	the	RE	model	prediction	when	restricting	our	analysis	to	the	8	sessions	in	
which	 the	market	was	 populated	 by	 experienced	 traders	 (see	Appendix	 C	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	
Markets	5	and	8	combined).	
5.	Discussion	
Whether	markets	 are	 able	 to	 aggregate	 dispersed	 information	 is	 a	 fundamental	 question	 in	
Economics	(Hayek,	1945).	Because	testing	the	strong-form	efficiency	of	markets	is	not	possible	
using	 archival	 data	 (Fama,	 1991),	 experimental	 markets	 were	 critical	 to	 test	 whether	 such	
efficiency	was	achievable.	The	breakthrough	design	proposed	by	P&S	 thus	made	 the	efficient	
markets	hypothesis	falsifiable.	Although	the	original	findings	in	P&S	show	that	it	is	possible	for	
markets	 to	 achieve	 strong-form	 efficiency,	 our	 data	 show	 these	 findings	 are	 indeed	 fragile.	
Moreover,	neither	the	existence	of	contingent	claims	nor	common	dividend	values	seem	to	be	
																																								 																				
9	 Each	model	 is	 silent	with	 regards	 to	which	 specific	 traders	 of	 a	 given	 type	with	 a	 given	 piece	 of	 information	
should	hold	 the	assets.	That	 is,	 if	 two	 traders	are	of	 the	 type	and	 information	predicted	 to	purchase	 two	assets	














Series	 Market	 Replicate	 PI	 RE	 MM	
B	
4	
1	 8644.73	 638.31	 245.51	
2	 8782.26	 684.59	 262.73	
3	 8932.91	 686.13	 283.23	
4	 8302.06	 604.81	 245.21	
5	
1	 24266.25	 2721.85	 1949.32	
2	 25360.95	 2474.61	 2182.88	
3	 24838.72	 1912.72	 1989.12	
4	 25273.38	 2858.71	 2068.18	
C	
7	
1	 4281.22	 49.62	 3422.95	
2	 4752.76	 7.30	 3787.30	
3	 5473.51	 36.55	 4783.22	
4	 3408.69	 201.63	 2894.96	
8	
1	 819.42	 51.95	 145.95	
2	 729.95	 3.95	 42.61	
3	 272.03	 1220.29	 1578.69	
4	 952.74	 13.57	 401.57	
9	
1	 1489.34	 1197.76	 951.10	
2	 2969.62	 95.46	 3762.12	
3	 2224.53	 256.19	 2989.52	





















applicable.	 	Each	statistical	test	compares	RE	to	an	alternative	model.	 	Each	cell	 in	the	
lower	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	
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Market	 Model	 True	State	X	 Y	 Z	
4X	
RE	 230	 0	 0	
PI	 146	 146	 101	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
4Y	
RE	 0	 160	 0	
PI	 58	 58	 49	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
4Z	
RE	 0	 0	 300	
PI	 169	 208	 208	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
5X	
RE	 460	 0	 0	
PI	 230	 230	 230	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
5Y	
RE	 0	 320	 0	
PI	 160	 160	 160	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
5Z	
RE	 0	 0	 600	
PI	 300	 300	 300	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
7	
RE	 50	 240	 590	
PI	 270	 365	 365	
MM	 50	 240	 240	
8	
RE	 125	 375	 450	
PI	 325	 450	 450	
MM	 125	 375	 375	
9	
RE	 50	 240	 490	
PI	 210	 317	 317	










Market	 Model	 True	State	X	 Y	 Z	
4X	
RE	 II	 ̶	 ̶	
PI	 II	(Not	Z)	 II	(Not	Z)	 II	(Not	Y)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
4Y	
RE	 ̶	 III	 ̶	
PI	 III	(Not	Z)	 III	(Not	Z)	 III	(Not	X)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
4Z	
RE	 ̶	 ̶	 I	
PI	 I	(Not	Y)	 I	(Not	X)	 I	(Not	X)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
5X	
RE	 II	 ̶	 ̶	
PI	 II	 II	(Not	Z)	 II	(Not	Y)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
5Y	
RE	 ̶	 III	 ̶	
PI	 III	(Not	Z)	 III	 III	(Not	X)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
5Z	
RE	 ̶	 ̶	 I	




PI	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	
MM	 All	(no	trade)	 Not	X	 Not	X	
8	
RE	 All	(no	trade)	
PI	 Not	Y	 Not	X	 Not	X	
MM	 All	(no	trade)	 Not	X	 Not	X	
9	
RE	 All	(no	trade)	
PI	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	





















































This	 is	 an	 experiment	 in	 the	 economics	 of	 market	 decision	 making.	 Various	 research	
foundations	have	provided	funds	for	this	research.	The	instructions	are	simple,	and	if	you	follow	























You	 have	 to	 predict	 the	 outcome	 of	 each	 draw	 before	 it	 is	 announced.	 If	 your	 prediction	 is	
correct,	 you	win	 $0.50;	 if	wrong,	 you	 lose	 $0.20.	 Before	 the	 first	 draw	 is	made,	 record	 your	
prediction	by	circling	either	x	or	y	or	 z	 in	 the	 first	 row	of	 the	enclosed	sheet.	After	you	have	
encircled	 one	 letter,	 the	 outcome	will	 be	 announced	 and	 you	 should	 record	 the	 announced	
outcome	in	the	blank	space	on	the	same	row	of	the	table.	If	your	prediction	is	correct,	circle	the	
amount	shown	in	the	Win	column,	otherwise	circle	the	amount	shown	in	the	Lose	column.		
Once	 you	 have	 recorded	 your	 prediction	 you	 must	 not	 make	 a	 change;	 any	 erasure	 will	


















1 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
2 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
3 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
4 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
5 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
6 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
7 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
8 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
9 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
10 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
 
       Total winnings      _________        
       Total losses      _________ 









Each	 year	we	 draw	 a	 ball	 from	 a	 bingo	 cage	 containing	 twenty	 balls	 numbered	 one	 through	
twenty.	If	the	ball	drawn	is	numbered	one	through	seven,	outcome	of	the	draw	is	called	x;	if	a	
ball	 numbered	 	 eight	 through	 sixteen	 is	 drawn,	 the	 outcome	 is	 called	 y;	 if	 a	 ball	 numbered	
seventeen	through	twenty	is	drawn,	the	outcome	is	called	z.		
You	 have	 to	 predict	 the	 outcome	 of	 each	 draw	 before	 it	 is	 announced.	 If	 your	 prediction	 is	
correct,	 you	win	 $0.50;	 if	wrong,	 you	 lose	 $0.20.	 Before	 the	 first	 draw	 is	made,	 record	 your	
prediction	by	circling	either	x	or	y	or	 z	 in	 the	 first	 row	of	 the	enclosed	sheet.	After	you	have	
encircled	 one	 letter,	 the	 outcome	will	 be	 announced	 and	 you	 should	 record	 the	 announced	
outcome	in	the	blank	space	on	the	same	row	of	the	table.	If	your	prediction	is	correct,	circle	the	
amount	shown	in	the	Win	column,	otherwise	circle	the	amount	shown	in	the	Lose	column.		
Once	 you	 have	 recorded	 your	 prediction	 you	 must	 not	 make	 a	 change;	 any	 erasure	 will	













You	 have	 to	 predict	 the	 outcome	 of	 each	 draw	 before	 it	 is	 announced.	 If	 your	 prediction	 is	
correct,	 you	win	 $0.50;	 if	wrong,	 you	 lose	 $0.20.	 Before	 the	 first	 draw	 is	made,	 record	 your	
prediction	by	circling	either	x	or	y	or	 z	 in	 the	 first	 row	of	 the	enclosed	sheet.	After	you	have	
encircled	 one	 letter,	 the	 outcome	will	 be	 announced	 and	 you	 should	 record	 the	 announced	
outcome	in	the	blank	space	on	the	same	row	of	the	table.	If	your	prediction	is	correct,	circle	the	
amount	shown	in	the	Win	column,	otherwise	circle	the	amount	shown	in	the	Lose	column.		
Once	 you	 have	 recorded	 your	 prediction	 you	 must	 not	 make	 a	 change;	 any	 erasure	 will	



































	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Columns	
		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	
1	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	
2	 not	z	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	
3	 not	x	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
4	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	x	
5	 not	z	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	
6	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	
7	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	
8	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	
9	 not	y	 not	z	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	
10	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	
11	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	y	
12	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	
13	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
14	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	
15	 not	x	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	
16	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	
17	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	
18	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	
19	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	 not	x	
20	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	x	
21	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	
22	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	
23	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	
24	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
25	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	
26	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	
27	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
28	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	
29	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	









them	 carefully	 and	 make	 good	 decisions,	 you	 might	 earn	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 money	
which	will	be	paid	to	you	in	cash.		
In	this	experiment	we	are	going	to	simulate	a	market	in	which	you	will	buy	and	sell	certificates	
in	 a	 sequence	 of	 market	 years.	 Attached	 to	 the	 instructions	 you	 will	 find	 a	 sheet,	 labeled	
information	 and	 record	 sheet,	which	 helps	 determine	 the	 value	 to	 you	 of	 any	 decisions	 you	












numbers	of	 francs	 listed	on	row	19	of	your	 information	and	record	sheet.	Note	that	earnings	
may	 be	 different	 for	 different	 investors.	 The	method	 by	which	 one	 of	 the	 three	 numbers	 is	
selected	 each	 year	 is	 explained	 later	 in	 these	 instructions.	 Compute	 your	 total	 certificate	
earnings	 for	a	period	by	multiplying	the	earnings	per	certificate	by	the	number	of	certificates	
held.	 That	 is,	 (number	 of	 certificates	 held)	 x	 (earnings	 per	 certificate)	 =	 total	 certificate	
earnings.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	you	hold	five	certificates	at	the	end	of	year	1.	 If	for	that	
period	your	earnings	are	_____	francs	per	certificate	(i.e.,	the	number	selected	from	row	19	is	
____)	 then	 your	 total	 certificate	 earnings	 in	 the	 year	would	 be	 5	 x	 ____	 =	 ____	 francs.	 This	
number	should	be	recorded	on	row	19	at	the	end	of	the	year.		
Sales	 from	 your	 certificate	 holdings	 increase	 your	 francs	 on	 hand	 by	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 sale	
price.	 Similarly,	 purchases	 reduce	 your	 francs	 on	hand	by	 the	 amount	of	 the	purchase	price.	
Thus	you	can	gain	or	lose	money	on	the	purchase	and	resale	of	certificates.	At	the	end	of	each	




















Whether	 the	dividend	 you	 receive	 from	 the	 certificates	 you	hold	 is	 the	x-dividend	 shown	on	
row	19	or	 the	y-dividend	on	 row	19	or	 the	z-dividend	on	 row	19	depends	on	 the	draw	of	an	
outcome	from	a	bingo	cage.		If	the	outcome	is	x	the	dividend	is	the	x-dividend.	If	the	outcome	is	











nature	of	 the	transaction.	The	first	 transaction	 is	 recorded	on	row	(1),	and	succeeding	
transactions	are	recorded	on	subsequent	rows.	
(2) After	each	transaction	you	must	calculate	and	record	your	new	holdings	of	certificates	









certificate	 you	 are	 short.	 Compute	 your	 end	 of	 period	 totals	 on	 row	 20	 by	 listing	
certificate	holdings	and	adding	total	certificate	earnings	to	your	francs	on	hand.	
(4) At	the	end	of	the	year,	subtract	from	your	francs	on	hand	the	amount	listed	in	row	21	








be	 conducted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 years.	 Each	 period	 lasts	 for	 seven	 minutes.	 Anyone	 wishing	 to	
purchase	 a	 certificate	 is	 free	 to	 raise	 his	 or	 her	 hand	 and	 make	 a	 verbal	 bid	 to	 buy	 one	
certificate	at	a	specified	price,	and	anyone	with	certificates	to	sell	is	free	to	accept	or	not	accept	
the	bid.	Likewise,	anyone	wishing	to	sell	a	certificate	is	free	to	raise	his	or	her	hand	and	make	a	
verbal	offer	 to	 sell	one	 certificate	at	 a	 specified	price.	 If	 a	bid	or	offer	 is	 accepted,	 a	binding	
contract	 has	 been	 closed	 for	 a	 single	 certificate,	 and	 the	 contracting	 parties	 will	 record	 the	













them	 carefully	 and	 make	 good	 decisions,	 you	 might	 earn	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 money	
which	will	be	paid	to	you	in	cash.		
In	this	experiment	we	are	going	to	simulate	a	market	in	which	you	will	buy	and	sell	certificates	
in	 a	 sequence	 of	 market	 years.	 Attached	 to	 the	 instructions	 you	 will	 find	 a	 sheet,	 labeled	
information	 and	 record	 sheet,	which	 helps	 determine	 the	 value	 to	 you	 of	 any	 decisions	 you	















the	 two	 numbers	 for	 each	 certificate	 type	 is	 selected	 each	 year	 is	 explained	 later	 in	 these	
instructions.	 Compute	 your	 total	 certificate	 earnings	 for	 a	 period	by	multiplying	 the	earnings	
per	certificate	of	a	given	type	by	the	number	of	certificates	of	that	type	held	and	then	summing	
these	 three	 amounts.	 That	 is,	 (number	 of	 x-certificates	 held)	 x	 (earnings	 per	 x-certificate)	 +	
(number	of	y-certificates	held)	x	(earnings	per	y-certificate)	+	(number	of	z-certificates	held)	x	
(earnings	per	z-certificate)	=	total	certificate	earnings.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	you	hold	five	












Sales	 from	 your	 certificate	 holdings	 increase	 your	 francs	 on	 hand	 by	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 sale	
price.	 Similarly,	 purchases	 reduce	 your	 francs	 on	hand	by	 the	 amount	of	 the	purchase	price.	
Thus	you	can	gain	or	lose	money	on	the	purchase	and	resale	of	certificates.	At	the	end	of	each	


















x	 then	 x-certificates	 receive	 the	 x-dividend	 shown	 on	 row	 19	 while	 y-certificates	 and	 z-
certificates	each	earn	0.				If	the	outcome	is	y	then	y-certificates	receive	the	y-dividend	shown	



















and	your	new	 francs	on	hand.	Your	holdings	of	 certificates	of	any	 type	may	go	below	
zero.	Your	francs	on	hand	may	never	go	below	zero.		
(8) At	the	end	of	the	year	record	your	total	certificate	earnings	in	the	last	column	of	row	19.	
If	 you	 have	 negative	 certificate	 holdings	 of	 a	 type,	 you	 receive	 no	 dividends	 for	 that	
type,	 and	 you	must	pay	 a	penalty	of	 300	 francs	plus	 the	highest	 transaction	price	 for	
that	 type	 during	 the	 period,	 for	 each	 certificate	 you	 are	 short.	 Compute	 your	 end	 of	
period	 totals	 on	 row	 20	 by	 listing	 certificate	 holdings	 and	 adding	 total	 certificate	
earnings	to	your	francs	on	hand.	
(9) At	the	end	of	the	year,	subtract	from	your	francs	on	hand	the	amount	listed	in	row	21	














for	 a	 single	 certificate,	 and	 the	 contracting	 parties	 will	 record	 the	 transaction	 on	 their	
information	 and	 record	 sheets.	 Any	 ties	 in	 bids	 or	 acceptance	 will	 be	 resolved	 by	 random	















Row Market Year Profit 
1 1  
2 2  
3 3  
4 4  
5 5  
6 6  
7 7  
8 8  
9 9  
10 10  
11 11  
12 12  
13 13  
14 14  
15 15  
16 16  
17 17  
18 18  
19 19  
20 20  
21   
22 Total profit (in francs)  
23 Dollars per franc 0.00311 







Trader No. ____ 










Beginning of the 




 1     
 2     
 3     
 4     
 5     
 6     
 7     
 8     
 9     
 10     
 11     
 12     
 13     
 14     
 15     
 16     
 17     








Total Certificate Earnings 
Dividend Rate 




Total Francs on Hand at the 
End of the Year 
 
 21 
 Less:  Fixed Costs 
 
 22 
 End of Year Net Profit 
 
Transfer this amount 





Trader No. ____ 





Sale      Purchase 
Certificates  
on Hand 
x   y   z 
Francs  
on Hand 
Beginning of the 
Year Holdings 0 
///////////////////// 
/////////////////////     
 1       
 2       
 3       
 4       
 5       
 6       
 7       
 8       
 9       
 10       
 11       
 12       
 13       
 14       
 15       
 16       
 17       








    Total Certificate Earnings 
    Dividend Rate 




    Total Francs on Hand at the 
    End of the Year  
 21 
     Less:  Fixed Costs  
 22 
     End of Year Net Profit  
    Transfer this amount 








Suppose	 that	Trader	13	wants	 to	offer	 to	buy	a	certificate	at	a	price	of	25.	 	Trader	13	would	
raise	 her	 paddle	 and	 the	 auctioneer	 would	 call	 on	 her	 saying	 something	 like	 “Trader	 13.”		
Trader	13	would	then	respond	with	“Bid	of	25.”	The	auctioneer	will	repeat	the	order:	“Trader	
13	Bids	25.”		This	will	be	recorded	on	the	board.		[The	order	is	marked	on	the	board.]			

















her	 Information	 and	 Record	 sheet	 that	 she	 sold	 a	 certificate	 by	writing	 the	 price	 in	 the	 Sale	
















At	 this	 point,	 the	 bid	 of	 60	 is	 circled	 and	 Traders	 17	 would	 record	 the	 price	 of	 60	 under	
Purchase	in	the	row	for	Transaction	1.	 	Trader	17	would	then	update	his	Certificates	on	Hand	























raise	 her	 paddle	 and	 the	 auctioneer	 would	 call	 on	 her	 saying	 something	 like	 “Trader	 13.”		














“Trader	 15	Accepts	Bid	on	X	of	 100.”	 	At	 this	 point	 Trader	 13	 and	15	have	 traded	a	 single	X	




























A	 line	 will	 be	 drawn	 across	 the	 market	 record	 for	 Y	 on	 the	 board	 indicating	 that	 all	 of	 the	




given	 the	 fictitious	 values	 in	 this	 example,	 Trader	 15	 would	 complete	 their	 Information	 and	
Record	Sheet	as	follows:	
Total	Certificate	Earnings	in	Row	19	would	be:	 9	*	0	+	9	*	100	+	10	*	0	=	900	
Total	Francs	on	Hand	in	Row	20	would	be:	 20,160	
End	of	Year	Net	Profit	in	Row	22	would	be:		 900	+	20,160	–	20,000	=	1,060.	
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Appendix	C.	Additional	findings		
	
Table	C1.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Prices	to	Prices	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	for	Sessions	w
ith	Experienced	
Traders	(M
arkets	5	and	8)	
	
M
AD	
Log	O
dds	U
nder	N
orm
ality	
Percentage	of	Convergent	Price	
Changes	
	
	
	
	PI	
		RE	
M
M
	
PI	
		RE	
M
M
	
PI	
				RE	
M
M
	
W
ilcoxon	Signed	Ranked	Sum
	
Tests	
			↑_____↑	
			↓	
↑______↑	
								↓	
		↑______↑	
↓	
↑______↑	
↓	
											↑_______↑	
									↓	
↑________↑	
													↓	
All	Sessions	
29	
0.124(PI)	
25	
0.327(RE)	
23	
0.484(PI)	
30	
0.093(RE)	
30	
0.079(RE)	
26	
0.262(RE)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	
w
hich	the	state	w
as	Z.		Each	statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	low
er	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	
statistic	and	level	of	significance	as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	one	favored	by	the	data.		This	table	is	com
parable	to	Table	III	in	Plott	and	Sunder	
(1988).			
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Table	C2.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Allocations	w
ith	the	Allocations	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	
Criterion:	Percent	of	Predicted	Flow
	of	Securities	that	Actually	O
ccurred	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	
for	Sessions	w
ith	Experienced	Traders	(M
arkets	5	and	8)	
	
M
odels	
												PI	
											RE	
M
M
	
W
ilcoxon	Rank	Sum
	Tests	
												↑___________↑	
																				↓	
↑___________↑	
																				↓	
All	Sessions	
39	
0.027(RE)	
24	
0.083(M
M
)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	the	last	
period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Z,	as	applicable.		Each	
statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	low
er	portion	of	the	table	
contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	
one	favored	by	the	data	based	on	the	m
edian.		This	table	is	com
parable	to	Table	IV	in	Plott	and	Sunder	
(1988).		How
ever,	P&
S	report	that	a	W
ilcoxon	Signed	Rank	Sum
	Test	is	used,	but	that	test	is	not	
defined	for	any	com
parison	betw
een	RE	and	another	m
odel	except	for	a	test	betw
een	PI	and	RE	in	
Series-B	M
arkets.		The	test	statistic	for	such	a	test	w
ould	be	0	based	on	our	data	w
ith	a	p-value	of	
0.012	w
ith	the	data	favoring	RE.							
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Table	C3.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Distribution	of	Profits	to	Distribution	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	
Criterion:	Squared	Sum
	of	Deviations	from
	the	M
ean	Across	Investors	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	
for	Sessions	w
ith	Experienced	Traders	(M
arkets	5	and	8)	
	
M
odels	
	
	
	
					PI	
RE	
	M
M
	
W
ilcoxon	Signed	Ranked	Sum
	
Tests	
						↑_________↑	
														↓	
↑_________↑	
														↓	
All	Sessions	
32	
0.050(RE)	
19	
0.889(RE)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	
the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Z,	as	
applicable.		Each	statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	
low
er	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	
as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	one	favored	by	the	data.		This	table	is	
com
parable	to	Table	V	in	Plott	and	Sunder	(1988).			
				
